Second Cause of Action, Page 14, Paragraph 61:

1. 61. In failing to disclose, actively concealing and making misrepresentations to Plaintiff, the Defendants acted fraudulently, willfully and oppressive, with knowledge that Plaintiff would rely upon the Defendants' misrepresentations. As a consequence thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial—which will be sufficient to punish the Defendants.

Third Cause of Action, Page 15, Paragraph 72:

2. 72. In failing to disclose, actively concealing and making misrepresentations to Plaintiff, the Defendants acted fraudulently, willfully and oppressive, with knowledge that Plaintiff would rely upon the Defendants' misrepresentations. As a consequence thereof, Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages in an amount to be proved at trial—which will be sufficient to punish the Defendants.

Prayer For Relief, Page 31:

AS TO THE THIRD AND NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION

3. For punitive damages allowed by law; (As against Moving Parties)

This Motion is made pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 435 and 436. This Motion will be made on the grounds that the above specified portions of the Complaint constitute an improper matter. This Motion will be made on further grounds that the items to be stricken are irrelevant, false, improper or otherwise not filed in conformity with the laws of the State of California.

The Motion is based upon this Notice and Motion and Motion, the Memorandum of Points and Authorities, all papers and pleadings on file herein, and upon such other oral and/or further material and argument as may be presented at the hearing on the Motion to Strike.

| /// | /// | ///

///

CARLSON LAW GROUP, INC.

By: **SH**

Mark C. Carlson, Esq.

Warren K. Miller, Esq., Of Counsel Attorneys for Defendants, SILVERWOOD PROPERTIES, INC. and KENNETH HOWARD

SHAPIRO

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of the purchase and sale of 6257 Pine Crest Drive, Los Angeles, California 90042 (the "Subject Property") by Plaintiff David A. Glazer ("Plaintiff") from the Defendant Chaney Shapiro ("Seller"), the escrow for which closed in 2014. Moving Parties represented the Seller as Listing Agent and Broker in the sale of the Subject Property. Following taking possession of the Subject Property, Plaintiff discovered certain defects which he alleges were not disclosed to him during the transaction. As a result, Plaintiff filed suit against the Seller, Moving Parties and others.

II. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

Code of Civil Procedure section 435 subdivision (b)(1) provides that "[a]ny party within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any party thereto." Allegations or parts of causes of action for which there is no basis in law may be stricken from a cause of action. [Grieves v. Superior Court, 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 163-164 (1984) (punitive damages claims may be so stricken); Eldorado Bank v. Lytle (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d Supp. 17, 22 (motion to strike may be made against a demand for attorney's fees where their recovery is not authorized by statute or agreement).] A motion to strike shall be granted if "any part of any pleading is not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule or an order of the court." [Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).]

B. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO PROPERLY ALLEGE PUNITIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS TO SILVERWOOD

Corporations are legal entities which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to injure or deceive; therefore, an award of punitive damages against a corporation must rest on the malice of the corporation's employees. [Cruz v. HomeBase (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167.] However, the law does not impute every employee's malice to the corporation; instead, the punitive damage statute requires proof of malice among corporate leaders: the "officer[s], director[s], or managing agent [s]." [Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (b).] By so confining liability, the statute avoids punishing the corporation for malice of low-level employees which does not reflect the corporate

"state of mind" or the intentions of corporate leaders. [Cruz, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at 167; see also College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 726 (for ratification sufficient to justify punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers, directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character).]

Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts whatsoever that any "officer, director, or managing agent" of Moving Party, SILVERWOOD, engaged in any conduct sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages against the corporation. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts whatsoever that any officer, director, or managing agent had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and its outrageous character. Consequently, Plaintiff's request for punitive damages against Moving Party, SILVERWOOD, must be stricken from the Complaint.

SILVERWOOD respectfully submits that the Complaint fails to set forth specific facts which would attribute any malicious conduct on behalf of SILVERWOOD'S employee and whether the employee was an officer, director, and/or managing agent of SILVERWOOD. As a result, Plaintiff's allegations of entitlement to punitive damages against SILVERWOOD must be stricken.

C. THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO PROPERLY ALLEGE THEIR ENTITLEMENT TO PUNITIVE AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS TO SHAPIRO

It is well-settled that language which simply characterizes the defendant's conduct as "malicious" is insufficient to support a request for punitive damages and is subject to a motion to strike. [G.D. Searle & Co. v. Superior Court, (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 30.] And, "a breach of fiduciary duty alone without malice, fraud or oppression does not permit an award of punitive damages." [Delos v. Farmers Group (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 642, 656-657; Flyer's Body Shop v. Ticor Title (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1154.] Stated otherwise, "something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive damages...." [Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895.] To establish malice, it is not sufficient to show only that the defendant's conduct was negligent, grossly negligent or even reckless. [G. D. Searle & Co, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at 31-32.] That is, the mere carelessness or ignorance of the defendant does not justify the imposition of punitive damages, but instead, what is required is "conduct that rises to such a level of extreme indifference that decent citizens should not tolerate it." [Hughes v. Blue Cross (1989) 215 Cal. App.3d

832, 847.]

In Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042, the plaintiff claimed entitlement to punitive damages based on the defendants' failure to adequately represent her and her property interests in a dissolution proceeding alleging, *inter alia*:

"[D]efendants...misrepresented and fraudulently concealed the true nature of the representation being afforded by...defendants and that plaintiff's legal interests and rights were being protected, when in fact, they were not. The defendants' conduct...was intentional, knowing, malicious, fraudulent, false and deceitful. Said acts and omissions were undertaken with a conscious and knowing disregard of the interests and rights of plaintiff and to benefit the defendants...financially, and were part and parcel of a scheme and plan to defraud plaintiff. Defendants' conduct...was thus such as to constitute oppression, fraud or malice...."

[Id. at 1036.] The Court held that these allegations were conclusory as a matter of law and properly had the request for punitive damages stricken from the complaint. [Id. at 1042; see also Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872 (holding complaint's conclusory characterization of defendant conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent was a patently insufficient statement of "oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied" within meaning of section 3294).]

Here, Plaintiff simply parrot the "buzz words" of Civil Code section 3294 and characterize the alleged conduct of Moving Party, SHAPIRO as "fraudulently, willfully and oppressive." This is insufficient for purposes of the punitive damages statute. Consequently, Plaintiff's request for punitive damages against Moving Party, SHAPIRO, must be stricken from the Complaint, as detailed in the Notice of Motion.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Moving Parties respectfully request that the Court grant their Motion and strike those portions in the Complaint, as outlined in the Notice of Motion. In addition, should Plaintiff fail to demonstrate in their Opposition to this Motion to Strike, if any, the ability to cure the defects set out, *supra*, in a First Amended Complaint, the Motion to Strike should be sustained *without leave to amend*. (*Titus v. Canyon Lake Property Owners Assn.* (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 906.

///

CARLSON LAW GROUP, INC.

By:

Dated: September 22, 2017

Mark C. Carlson, Esq.

Warren K. Miller, Esq., Of Counsel Attorneys for Defendants, SILVERWOOD PROPERTIES, INC. and KENNETH HOWARD

SHAPIRO

PROOF OF SERVICE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18 and not a party to the within action; my present address is: 21031 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 1100, Woodland Hills, California 91364.

On September 22, 2017, I served the foregoing document described as NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION OF DEFENDANTS SILVERWOOD PROPERTIES, INC. AND KENNETH HOWARD SHAPIRO TO STRIKE ALL ALLEGATIONS PERTAINING TO PLAINTIFF'S ENTITLEMENT TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES on the parties by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope addressed as follows:

SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST

XX BY MAIL as follows: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Woodland Hills, California in the ordinary course of business.

BY OVERNIGHT EXPRESS DELIVERY. I deposited it in a box or other facility regularly maintained by GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT/FEDERAL EXPRESS, or delivered it to a driver or courier authorized by GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT/FEDERAL EXPRESS to receive documents, in an envelope designated by GOLDEN STATE OVERNIGHT/FEDERAL EXPRESS, with deliver fees provided for, and with delivery requested for the next business day.

BY FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION, by use of facsimile machine telephone number (818) 884-4285, in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure §1013(e) and California Rules of Court 2.306, to the within parties at the facsimile number(s) indicated. The fax machine I used complied with Rule 2.301 and this transmission was reported as complete and without error. Under Rule 2.304, I caused the machine to print a transmission record of the transmission report which was issued by the transmitting facsimile machine, a copy of which is attached to the original thereof.

Executed on September 22, 2017, at Woodland Hills, California.

 \underline{XX} (State) I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is true and correct.


Karon Rudolph

1	David A. Glazer v. Cheney Adrienne Shapiro, et al.
2	LASC Case No.: BC669741
3	Ronald A. Hartmann, Esq.
4	Kurt E. Kananen, Esq. HARTMANN & KANANEN
	5743 Corsa Avenue, Suite 119
5	Westlake Village, CA 91362
6	Telephone No.: (818) 710-0151 Facsimile No.: (818) 710-0191
7	E-Mail: Ronald Hartmann < construction defects@sbcglobal.net >
8	E-Mail: Kurt E. Kananen < kurtkananen@sbcglobal.net >
9	Attorneys for Plaintiff DAVID A. GLAZER
10	Timothy R. Lee, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY R. LEE
11	445 S. Beverly Drive, 2 nd Floor
12	Beverly Hills, CA 90212
13	Telephone: (310) 826-2666 Facsimile: (310) 826-2696
	E-Mail: Timothy R. Lee < trleelaw@hotmail.com>
14	Attorneys for Plaintiff DAVID A. GLAZER
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	
26	,
27	
28	

THIS IS YOUR CRS RECEIPT

INSTRUCTIONS

Please print this receipt and attach it to the corresponding motion/document as the last page. Indicate the Reservation ID on the motion/document face page (see example). The document will not be accepted without this receipt page and the Reservation ID.



RESERVATION INFORMATION

Reservation ID:

170922253266

Transaction Date:

September 22, 2017

Case Number:

Courthouse:

BC669741

Case Title: Party:

DAVID A GLAZER VS CHENEY ADRIENNE SHAPIRO ET AL SILVERWOOD PROPERTIES INC (Defendant/Respondent)

SIL

Stanley Mosk Courthouse

Department:

17

Reservation Type:

Motion to Strike (not anti-SLAPP) - without Demurrer

Date: Time: 10/23/2017 08:30 am

FEE INFORMATION (Fees are non-refundable)

First Paper Fee: (See below)

Description		Fee
First Paper (Unlimited Civil)		\$435.00
Total Fees:	Receipt Number: 1170922K8728	\$435.00

PAYMENT INFORMATION

Name on Credit Card:

Mark Carlson

Credit Card Number:

XXXX-XXXX-XXXX-2740

09/26/201

A COPY OF THIS RECEIPT MUST BE ATTACHED TO THE CORRESPONDING MOTION/DOCUMENT AS THE LAST PAGE AND THE RESERVATION ID INDICATED ON THE MOTION/DOCUMENT FACE PAGE.